This article needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (September 2025)

The Yemeni crisis began with the 2011–2012 revolution against President Abdullah Saleh, who had led Yemen for 33 years.^[1][2] After Saleh left office in early 2012 as part of a mediated agreement between the Yemeni government and opposition groups, the government led by Saleh's former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, faced challenges in governing Yemen’s divided political landscape and addressing armed opposition from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthi militant movement that had been waging a protracted insurgency in the north for years.^[3][4][5]

In September 2014, the conflict escalated into a civil war when Houthi forces entered the capital of Sanaa and forced Hadi to negotiate a "unity government" with other political factions.^[3] The Houthis continued their advance and influence over government operations until, after forces aligned with the Houthis reportedly attacked his presidential palace and private residence, Hadi resigned along with his ministers in January 2015.^[6][7]

The following month, the Houthis declared themselves in control of the Yemeni government, dissolving the Parliament, and installing an interim Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed al-Houthi, a cousin of Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.^[6][7] Hadi escaped to Aden, where he declared that he remains Yemen's legitimate president, proclaimed the country's temporary capital, and called on loyal government officials and members of the military to rally to him.^[8][9]

On 27 March 2015, the BBC reported that Hadi had "fled rebel forces in the city of Aden" and subsequently "arrived in Saudi Arabia's capital Riyadh" as "Saudi authorities began air strikes in Yemen".^[10] Since 2017 the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) has also fought against the government.^[3]

The wave of protests known as the Arab Spring did not take long to arrive in Yemen after the Tunisian revolution (2011–2012). Yemen was one of the poorest countries in the region. Its government faced widespread allegations of corruption, with a large amount of weapons in private hands. By 2011, the country was already facing challenges from al Qaeda-linked militants and separatists in the south and Zaydī Shīʿa Muslim rebels in the north. Yemen had only been unified since 1990, and deep divisions persisted between the north and south.^[3]

Yemen's political instability has been compounded and partly caused by the severe ecological crisis in the country. As of 2023, the average Yemeni has access to only 86 m³ of renewable freshwater per year for all uses, (62 gallons per day)^[11] compared to a Middle Eastern regional average of approximately 631 m³,^[12] both of which are significantly below the internationally defined threshold for water stress of 1,700 m³ per capita per year.^[13] Yemen's groundwater is the main source of water in the country but the water tables have dropped severely, leaving the country without a viable source of water. For example, in Sanaa, the water table was 30 meters below surface in the 1970s but had dropped to 1200 meters below surface by 2012. The groundwater has not been regulated by Yemen's governments.^[14]

Even before the revolution, Yemen's water situation had been described as increasingly dire with some environmental analysts warning that Yemen could be among the first countries to face extreme water scarcity if current trends continue.^[15] Agriculture in Yemen takes up about 90% of water in Yemen even though it only generates 6% of GDP - however a large portion of Yemenis are dependent on small-scale subsistence agriculture. Half of agricultural water in Yemen is used to grow khat, a narcotic that most Yemenis chew. This means that in such a water-scarce country as Yemen, where half the population is food-insecure, 45% of the water withdrawn from the ever-depleting aquifers is used to grow a crop that feeds nobody.^[14]

This water insecurity has a direct impact on political stability. Outsiders hear most about the proxy war between factions supported by other countries, but according to the Yemeni newspaper Al-Thawra, 70% to 80% of conflicts in the country's rural regions are water-related. The country's Interior Ministry has estimated that across the country, water and land related disputes kill 4,000 people a year - more than terrorism.^[16] In Al-Jawf Governorate, a dispute over a well's placement has led to a blood feud that has continued for more than 30 years^[14]

In 2007, Yemen's minister of Water and Natural Resources suggested that Sanaa, the capital city, might have to be evacuated if it runs out of water.^[17] Although the government was unable to move the capital in an orderly and peaceful way, the war and political crisis have rendered Sanaa and most of Yemen into a battleground that people have been forced to flee.

Additional environmental catastrophes have battered Yemen as the war has progressed. In late 2015, two historic cyclones struck the country. The first of these, Cyclone Chapala, struck the island of Socotra before hitting the port of Mukalla on Yemen's south coast, where it caused catastrophic flash flooding.^[18] This storm, combined with the following Cyclone Megh, left enough moisture in the soil for locusts to breed. These locusts can fly 100 miles in a day and destroy any crop they encounter.^[19]

Yemen's political crisis began in 2011, amid the Arab Spring and the ongoing Houthi insurgency, South Yemen insurgency, and the Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen.

Popular protests broke out in early 2011, led by both secular and Islamist opposition groups.^[20] Longtime rebel groups like the Houthis and the Southern Movement also participated in the protests.^[21][22] Saleh responded with a violent crackdown, and the country nearly disintegrated into an all-out civil war as several army elements broke with the government and joined the protesters, beginning in March.^[23][24]

Saleh was almost killed when a bomb went off in a mosque where he and other top government officials were praying on 3 June, apparently in an assassination attempt.^[25][26] While his condition initially appeared grave, Saleh recovered and returned to work on 23 September after several months of medical treatment in Saudi Arabia.^[27] He left Vice President Hadi in charge during his absence. As acting president, Hadi met with the opposition and reportedly expressed openness to political reforms. However, he rejected the idea of forcing Saleh from power without the president's consent.^[28]

The Gulf Co-operation Council applied no small amount of pressure on Saleh to negotiate an end to the uprising by stepping down.^[29] Weeks after returning from Saudi Arabia, Saleh finally agreed on 23 November to resign in exchange for immunity. As part of the deal, the opposition agreed to allow Hadi to stand unopposed for the presidency in 2012.^[30]

Meanwhile, the insurgent Houthis in northern Yemen laid siege to a Salafi town in Saada Governorate, Dammaj. Fighting was worst in November and December. The Yemeni military was unable to restore order due to the crisis elsewhere in the country.^[31]

The Yemeni Revolution came to an apparently successful conclusion in 2012 for the opposition, as Saleh left office. However, unrest continued in both northern and southern Yemen.

Hadi's election on 24 February 2012 peacefully introduced a new government in Yemen, with only a small percentage of voters spoiling their ballots in the single-candidate contest.^[32] Hadi, a southerner, especially enjoyed support in former South Yemen, quieting the murmurs of separatism,^[33] although the Southern Movement boycotted the presidential election, as did the Houthis.^[34] Hadi did not give the restive Houthis any seats in his cabinet.^[1]

The conflict in Dammaj was renewed in April when fighting broke out between Houthi tribesmen and Salafi students. Both sides accused the other of breaking a truce agreement.^[35]

National reconciliation talks were held with the participation of many separatist elements, as well as the Houthis.^[1][33]

Nine years after the death of Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the Yemeni government turned over the remains of the Houthi patriarch to his family and he was buried in northern Yemen in June 2013, with a representative of the Hadi administration in attendance.^[36]

Hadi visited the United States, a key overseas ally, in July 2013. The U.S. also lifted a ban on transferring detainees from its Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba to Yemen.^[37]

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia deported as many as 300,000 to 400,000 Yemeni migrant workers to their home country during 2013, causing an influx of poor, landless Yemenis into northern Yemen.^[38]

The conflict between Houthis and Salafis in Saada Governorate was renewed in October and November. Saada government officials accused Houthi fighters of attacking a Salafi mosque in Dammaj in an attempt to drive the Sunnis out, while the Houthis accused the Salafis of using the religious institute as a staging ground for foreign Sunni fighters. The government attempted to intervene to stop the fighting.^[39]

Sectarian fighting in Al Jawf Governorate lasted throughout the year. Dhamar Governorate also saw clashes between the Houthis and Salafis toward the end of the year.^[40]

In a dramatic turn of events, the rebel Houthis took broad control of northern Yemen, including the capital of Sanaa itself, in 2014.^{[editorializing][citation needed]}

Clashes in Dammaj spread to the Amran Governorate by January 2014.^[41] The Houthis achieved victory in Saada when the Yemeni government brokered a deal under which Salafi fighters and their families were evacuated to the neighboring Al Hudaydah Governorate.^[42] According to reports, the Houthis then blocked government troops from fully deploying throughout the territory, in spite of a signed agreement.^[43]

Fighting in the Amran Governorate intensified during the year, with clashes between Houthis and supporters of the Islamist Islah Party eventually leading to a Houthi takeover of the entire governorate. The conflict spread to the Sanaa Governorate by July.^[40]

The Houthis began protesting against Hadi's government to demand concessions in order to resolve a years-long insurgency they had been waging against the Yemeni state in mid-2014.^[44] The uprising escalated dramatically as Houthi fighters swept into Sanaa, the capital, and effectively seized control of the city from the Yemeni military within a couple of days in September. The forces of General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmer surrendered to the Houthis after a brief fight.^[45]

Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president, was widely suspected of aiding the Houthis behind the scenes and helping pave the way for their takeover.^[46] Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa resigned on 21 September as part of a deal meant to end the standoff.^[47]

The Houthis and the government agreed on 21 September to form a "unity government" within one month.^[48] However, the Houthis rejected Hadi's original choice of prime minister, Ahmad Awad bin Mubarak,^[49] and Oil Minister Khaled Bahah was appointed instead with the armed group's approval.^[50] The Houthis and the General People's Congress led by Saleh announced abruptly on 8 November that they would not participate in the unity government, claiming it was unacceptable to them.^[51] The boycott prompted sanctions against Saleh and senior Houthi leaders from the United Nations Security Council and the United States Department of the Treasury.^[52]

Yemen was riven in 2015, with the Houthis establishing a new government in Sanaa and Hadi retreating with his supporters to Aden, and later Saudi Arabia. The Arab League, led by the Saudis, began a bombing campaign and mobilization of various armed forces in the region for a possible invasion.

The Houthis stepped up their pressure on Hadi's weakened government, seizing the presidential palace and strategic military installations in Sanaa and shelling the president's private residence on 20 January. The following day, they took control of Hadi's home, stationing armed guards outside to keep him under virtual house arrest.^[53]

Hadi, Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, and the cabinet resigned the following day, saying they could not continue to work under the conditions the Houthis had imposed. The rebel group welcomed Hadi's resignation, but continued to keep him under house arrest. The news prompted four southern governorates to announce they would disregard all orders from Sanaa.^[54]

The House of Representatives was to meet on 25 January to discuss whether to accept or reject Hadi's resignation under the Yemeni constitution, but the session was cancelled after the Houthis took control of the parliament building. The United Nations stepped in to attempt a negotiated resolution to what many in Yemen regarded as a Houthi coup.^[55]

UN negotiations were fruitless, and a Houthi ultimatum to Yemen's political factions to find a solution was not met. On 6 February, the Houthis declared themselves in total control of the Yemeni government, dissolving parliament and installing a Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi to lead the state in an interim capacity. The announcement sparked protests in Sanaa and other cities, especially in the south.^[56][57]

Reactions to the Houthi takeover were broadly negative, with the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, United Nations, and United States refusing to recognise the "constitutional declaration" and several governorates rejecting the Houthis' authority. With most political parties criticising the coup, Jamal Benomar, the UN envoy to Yemen, announced a resumption of national talks over the future of Yemen on 8 February. Benomar said the Houthis had agreed to participate in the talks.^[58] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for Hadi to be reinstated as president.^[59]

The Houthis and other factions reached a tentative agreement, announced on 20 February, to keep the House of Representatives in place despite the "constitutional declaration" dissolving it two weeks prior. The agreement also stipulated that a "people's transitional council" would be established to represent southerners, women, youth, and other political minorities.^[60] The next day, Hadi traveled to Aden, where he said all Houthi-directed actions since 21 September 2014 were invalid, and condemned the coup d'état.^[61][62]

Fighting broke out over Aden International Airport on 19 March, with special forces loyal to ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh attempting to seize the airport before they were defeated by troops and militiamen under orders from the Hadi administration.^[63] The following day, in an apparently unrelated incident, four suicide bombers detonated themselves in Sanaa mosques packed with Houthi congregants, killing at least 142. The Sunni Islamist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Yemen branch claimed responsibility.^[64][65]

Hadi declared Aden to be Yemen's temporary capital on 21 March while Sanaa remains under Houthi control.^[66] The next day, Houthi forces advanced toward Aden, capturing key parts of Yemen's third-largest city, Taiz.^[67] They consolidated their grip on much of the south and seized much of Aden itself by early April.^[68]

On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia and several other countries announced that they had begun military operations in Yemen against Houthi rebels. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates issued a statement along with Saudi Arabia saying their goal is to "repel Houthi aggression" in Yemen. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan are also members of the coalition.^[69]

In addition to airstrikes against targets throughout Yemen, which the General People's Congress blamed for causing dozens of civilian casualties,^[70] Egyptian warships reportedly shelled a Houthi column as it advanced toward Aden on 30 March,^[71] and Saudi and Houthi forces traded artillery and rocket fire across the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.^[72]

The 8 October 2016 attack by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition killed at least 140 people and injured more than 600 in Sanaa. This was one of the single worst death tolls in the two-year war. Saudi Arabia and its allies accepted the internal review's finding, by the Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT), that the coalition's bombardment of this funeral ceremony was based on faulty information, i.e., tha^[73]t this was a gathering of armed Houthi leaders.^[74][75]

The Yemeni civil war has been described as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.^[73][76] Out of a pre-war population of around thirty million, an estimated 23.4 million people now require humanitarian assistance, meaning that an 80 percent of Yemenis rely on some form of aid to survive. The conflict itself has also caused about 233,000 deaths, with half of them from indirect causes such as hunger and the collapse of health services, and 3.65 millions of displaced mostly within the country itself.^[77] Particularly alarming is the impact on Yemeni children, as nearly two million of them are considered acutely malnourished, and even more are living in areas classified under famine risk.^[77]

An estimated 90 percent of national Yemeni food consumption is dependent on imports, factor which makes the country particularly vulnerable to trade disruptions such as the one caused by the ongoing civil war.^[73][78] When trade flows were disrupted after 2015, this structural reliance rapidly translated into widespread food insecurity, with early UN assessments suggesting that two thirds of the population faced some degree of food shortage.^[73]

Subsequent analyses describe a population increasingly reliant on food aid because of a combination of factors: the uncontrolled inflation, the prolonged suspension of many public-sector salaries, and the naval controls and port inspections imposed by the Saudi-led coalition, which slow and reduce imports through the main Red Sea ports, all are frequently cited as important factors to the economic stagnation.^[79][73] Between January and November 2020, the average cost of meeting food requirements was estimated to have risen by about 16 percent, making basic needs harder to afford even where these were still available.^[77] Humanitarian organisations and UN officials have repeatedly warned that all these dynamics are “starving” Yemen and have placed the country in a situation which the UN Secretary-General defined as the worst famine seen globally in decades.^[77][76]

Access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation has deteriorated sharply over the course of the conflict. Studies link this to the bombing and the neglect of water networks and sewage infrastructure, together with the collapse of already fragile public utilities, which has left millions of people in the main cities without reliable and safe piped water or functioning wastewater treatment.^[73] In many towns and rural areas instead, families usually depend on groundwater pumped by diesel engines and on trucked water supplies, both of which require fuel that must be imported; during a period of complete closure of key ports in November 2017, humanitarian agencies estimated that around eight million people temporarily lost access to running water when fuel for pumps and distribution could not be procured.^[78]

The war has severely weakened Yemen’s health system. More than half of the country’s health facilities have been reported as non-functional, a situation attributed to airstrikes, damage to buildings, departures or non-payment of staff, and long-term shortages of medicines and equipment.^[73][77]Facilities that continue to operate frequently do so under difficult conditions, facing unreliable electricity, scarce fuel for generators and obstacles in maintaining hygiene standards or cold-chain storage. Researchers link these operation difficulties to port restrictions, disrupted supply chains and the broader economic crisis.^[73][78]

This institutional collapse has coincided with a series of major epidemics. Yemen has experienced what many researchers describe as the largest recorded cholera outbreak in modern times, with over one million suspected cases and earlier World Health Organization estimates of more than 600,000 cases with over 2,000 deaths.^[73][76] The spread of cholera has been associated with the destruction of water treatment plants, malfunctioning sewage systems and fuel shortages that hindered water pumping and waste disposal. Interruptions in vaccination campaigns and the wider deterioration of primary health care also facilitated outbreaks of diphtheria and measles,^[73][78]while when the COVID-19 pandemic reached Yemen, observers reported delayed vaccine delivery, limited testing capacity and additional economic pressure due to rising prices and economic stagnation.^[77]

According to Al Jazeera, outdated medical equipment, airport closures, and budget cuts are jeopardizing patient outcomes in Yemen. More than a decade of war in Yemen has taken a heavy toll on the healthcare system. People in the country are unable to afford treatment for serious illnesses, such as cancer, due to restrictions on travel abroad for treatment, a lack of medical facilities, and insufficient resources.^[80]

Displacement has been a persistent feature of the conflict. Around 3.65 million Yemenis are estimated to be internally displaced, and many households have moved multiple times as fighting shifted between regions. These people often end up in overcrowded camps or informal settlements, or are absorbed into host communities whose resources and services are already under strain, which can limit displaced people access to shelter, education, health care and employment.^[73][77]

On the Red Sea coast, these patterns of displacement intersect with the decline of artisanal fishing. Before the war, fishing was the country’s second largest export sector after oil and gas and an important pillar of local livelihoods, providing work for more than half a million people and supporting an estimated 1.7 million.^[81] From 2015 onwards, airstrikes, naval attacks and blockades targeted fishing boats, landing sites and coastal settlements, which, combined with security restrictions and interception at sea, made fishing increasingly dangerous. Because of this, in some coastal areas only about half of the fishermen were able to continue going to sea, while in others the residents have completely abandoned their homes following repeated attacks.^[81]

Data indicate that the average monthly income of the fishermen still operating fell by around 45 percent, while the cost of boats and engines rose sharply as the currency weakened and imports became more expensive.^[81] At the same time, the volume of fish reaching inland markets such as Sanaʿa reportedly declined by more than half, while retail prices increased by roughly 30–40 percent. This combination of reduced supply and higher prices contributed also to the food insecurity problem. Moreover, the closure or partial shutdown of fish-processing plants, ice factories and related businesses led to thousands of job losses along the chain, with analysts noting how the sector may even experience further shocks, including the possibility of an oil spill in the Red Sea.^[81][78]

The FSO Safer, a floating oil storage and offloading tanker moored off Yemen’s Red Sea coast and holding around 1.1 million barrels of oil, has become a major humanitarian concern for the country. Since 2015, the vessel has not received proper maintenance, and experts have warned that corrosion or technical failure could lead to a large spill.^[78] Modelling exercises suggest that a serious spill could force the closure of major Red Sea ports such as Hudaydah and Salif, with the port of Aden possibly also affected in the Gulf of Aden. Such a scenario would cause an interruption of food assistance and a dramatically acute fuel shortage, among other consequences, and worsen the already severe humanitarian challenges the country is facing.^[78]

Humanitarian agencies in Yemen operate in an environment shaped by military, administrative and political constraints imposed by the different sides of the conflict. At sea, naval controls, inspection regimes and port restrictions have delayed or limited the arrival of food, fuel and medical supplies, creating recurrent logistical challenges.^[73][79]

In territories controlled by the Houthis instead, aid efforts have also been victim of a dense bureaucracy, as the creation of the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) gave the Houthis decisional power over project approvals, staff movement, and local partnerships among many others things.^[82] Reports from donors and humanitarian organizations describe then diversion of assistance, pressure to channel funds and contracts through Houthi-linked entities, black-market resale of aid and attempts to impose additional taxes on humanitarian programmes, all of which have delayed operations and increased their cost.^[82]

Donor governments have debated imposing stricter conditions or suspending some forms of assistance in response to these actions, but such measures have been pursued cautiously because of concerns that a reduction in aid would primarily affect civilians who depend on it.^[73][82]

• Outline of the Yemeni crisis, revolution, and civil war (2011–present)
• South Yemen insurgency
• COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen
• Yemen cholera outbreak

• Demystifying Yemen's Conflict (Midwest Diplomacy)
• Timeline: Yemen (BBC)