2026 Italian constitutional referendum

22–23 March 2026
Do you approve the text of the law revising Articles 87, paragraph 10, 102, paragraph 1, 104, 105, 106, paragraph 3, 107, paragraph 1, and 110 of the Constitution, approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 253 of 30 October 2025 under the title "Provisions Governing the Judicial System and the Establishment of the Disciplinary Court"?
Results
Choice Votes % Yes 13,250,709 46.76% No 15,085,410 53.24% Valid votes 28,336,119 98.94% Invalid or blank votes 304,104 1.06% Total votes 28,640,223 100.00% Eligible to vote/turnout 51,425,745 55.69%
Results by region

A constitutional referendum concerning the reform of the judicial system was held in Italy on 22 and 23 March 2026. Its purpose was to revise Title II and Title IV of Part II of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. It was the fifth constitutional referendum in the history of the Italian Republic.

Voters were asked whether they approved a constitutional law, often called the "Nordio Reform" (Riforma Nordio) after Carlo Nordio (the Minister of Justice), that would amend the Italian Constitution in various aspects, most notably by proposing the constitutional separation of career paths between judges and public prosecutors, the splitting of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) into two distinct bodies, and the selection of members by sortition rather than traditional election, as well as the establishment of a High Disciplinary Court to oversee disciplinary proceedings.

The government-initiated constitutional bill was approved by the Senate of the Republic on 30 October 2025. Since it did not reach the qualified two-thirds majority in each chamber of the Italian Parliament during the parliamentary approval process, pursuant to Article 138 of the Italian Constitution, the necessary signatures were soon collected to request a confirmatory constitutional referendum.

In a higher-than-expected turnout and in contrast to late polls showing a close election, after earlier polls had initially showed a significant advantage for those in favour, voters rejected the constitutional reform 53.2% to 46.8%. This was seen as a significant blow to the Meloni government. A quorum was not required for the referendum to be valid and the Nordio law submitted to referendum would have been promulgated if it had been confirmed by a majority of valid votes.

The constitutional law, published on 30 October 2025 in the General Series No. 253 of the Official Gazette (Gazzetta Ufficiale), pursuant to Article 138 of the Constitution, was subject to a constitutional referendum as it was approved without the required two-thirds majority;^[1] on 16 July 2025, the Senate of the Republic had approved the eight articles of the reform.^[2] The constitutional reform, promoted by the government of Giorgia Meloni, would have introduced structural amendments to Articles 87, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, and 110 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic, with the complete replacement of Articles 104 and 105, and would have required the constitutional separation of the careers of judicial magistrates (judges) and prosecutorial magistrates (public prosecutors), as well as the division of the CSM (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), the self-governing body of the Italian judiciary, into a Judicial CSM and a Prosecutorial CSM, each responsible for the career management of judicial and prosecutorial magistrates respectively.^[3]

The reform would have replaced the elective system for selecting CSM members with a random selection mechanism for the members of the two councils according to two different procedures: the "lay members" (one third of the total) would have been drawn by lot from a list of full university professors in legal disciplines and lawyers with at least fifteen years of professional practice, compiled by the Italian Parliament in joint session through election; the judicial members (two thirds of the total) would have been drawn by lot from among judicial magistrates and prosecutorial magistrates. A subsequent ordinary law would have been entrusted with determining the number of members of the two Councils and the detailed procedures for the drawing of lots.^[4]

The reform would have established the High Disciplinary Court (Alta Corte Disciplinare), to which disciplinary jurisdiction over ordinary magistrates was to be assigned, removing this function from the disciplinary section of the CSM that exercises it. The High Disciplinary Court was to be composed of fifteen members: three appointed by the president of Italy from among full university professors in legal disciplines and lawyers with at least twenty years of professional practice; three drawn by lot from a list of individuals with the same qualifications compiled by Parliament in joint session through election; six judicial magistrates and three prosecutorial magistrates drawn by lot from among members of the respective categories with at least twenty years of judicial service who perform or have performed functions at the Supreme Court of Cassation level. The High Disciplinary Court would have elected its president from among the judges appointed by the president of the Republic or drawn from the list compiled by Parliament. Appeals against decisions of the High Disciplinary Court, including on the merits, would have been admissible solely before the same High Disciplinary Court. A subsequent ordinary law would have been tasked with defining disciplinary offenses and corresponding sanctions, specifying the composition of the panels, regulating the disciplinary procedure, and establishing the rules necessary for the functioning of the High Disciplinary Court.^[5]

On 18 November 2025, the Central Referendum Office of the Supreme Court of Cassation, with an order notified on 19 November, admitted four requests for a constitutional referendum and set the question.^[6]

«Approvate il testo della legge costituzionale concernente "Norme in materia di ordinamento giurisdizionale e di istituzione della Corte disciplinare" approvato dal Parlamento e pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 253 del 30 ottobre 2025?»^[6]

"Do you approve the text of the constitutional law concerning 'Provisions Governing the Judicial System and the Establishment of the Disciplinary Court', approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 253 of 30 October 2025?"

On 6 February 2026, the Supreme Court of Cassation granted the request for a question containing further details on the articles of the Italian Constitution affected by the reform being proposed in the referendum,^[7] initially promoted through a petition by a group of anonymous activists, called the Committee of 15 Citizens, represented by the lawyer Carlo Guglielmi, specialised in labour law and affiliated with the Unione Sindacale di Base (USB);^[8] the Committee of 15 Citizens had reached the 500,000 signatures necessary for the official filing of the request with the Supreme Court of Cassation on 15 January.^[9] Also on 6 February, the Central Referendum Office of the Supreme Court of Cassation, following the request for a referendum made by 546,343 voters, issued a special ordinance admitting the new text of the referendum question,^[10] which was then authorised by the Council of Ministers and by President Sergio Mattarella.^[11]

«Approvate il testo della legge di revisione degli artt. 87, decimo comma, 102, primo comma, 104, 105, 106, terzo comma, 107, primo comma, e 110 della Costituzione approvata dal Parlamento e pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del 30 ottobre 2025 con il titolo "Norme in materia di ordinamento giurisdizionale e di istituzione della Corte disciplinare"?»^[12]

"Do you approve the text of the law revising Articles 87, paragraph 10, 102, paragraph 1, 104, 105, 106, paragraph 3, 107, paragraph 1, and 110 of the Constitution, approved by Parliament and published in the Official Gazette no. 253 of 30 October 2025 under the title 'Provisions Governing the Judicial System and the Establishment of the Disciplinary Court'?"

The reform and the referendum gave rise to a debate.^[14] Critics of the reform generally argued that it did not tackle the real issues of Italian justice,^[15] and would not make justice more efficient or just as claimed by some supporters,^[16] and that it was not democratic as it would eliminate the right of magistrates to freely elect their representatives in the CSM.^[17] They further argued that the public prosecutor would become a "super policeman" rather than an impartial one,^[18] who must seek the judicial truth and exculpatory evidence (Article 358 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure),^[19] that the separation of careers was irrelevant as they would account for less than one percent of all magistrates and that the Cartabia Reform already applied a separation of career, and that it would represent the end of the principle that "the law is the same for everyone" (la legge è uguale per tutti).^[20]

Critics negatively compared the reform to the classist justice system of the United States, arguing that the prosecutor, who is not "the prosecution's lawyer" but "the citizen's first defender" (a magistrate "with the obligation to seek the truth, just like a judge"), and that by transforming him into a separate figure, the new type of prosecutor under the reform "will inevitably be trained to be a policeman, that is, to accuse without considering whether someone is innocent or guilty", and that "our trial system risks becoming like that in the US, where the jury decides not who is guilty and who is innocent, but who has the best lawyer."^[21] The prominent judge and jurist Gustavo Zagrebelsky described the reform as "a retaliation by certain politicians against certain judiciaries to shift the constitutional balance in favour of the former's impunity and to the detriment of the latter's autonomy and independence".^[22]

Another argument, represented by the anti-mafia magistrate Raffaele Cantone, was that judges were at the same time accused of lacking independence from prosecutors and thus supporting the prosecution's arguments, and also of excessive garantism when rejecting the prosecution, for example when releasing suspects.^[23] The latter criticism was shared by Gian Domenico Caiazza (chairman of a pro-reform committee) in reference to Matteo Salvini's public messaging in the aftermath of a clash between a minority of violent protesters and the police in Turin.^[24] Cantone also observed that criminal justice is on the one hand accused of lacking effectiveness, blaming magistrates for direct consequences for public safety, and on the other hand is accused of being too "invasive" with respect to politics.^[23] 2021 data showed that first-instance acquittals were equal to 50%, a percentage that rises to 69.7% for trials held following opposition to a criminal conviction by the prosecutor, with critics suggesting that sharing the same order does not impact or condition judicial decisions.^[19]

Critics, even among those in favour of the career separation,^[25] cited the lack of discussion between the government and the opposition in writing the reform, and those who voted against the reform in Parliament, such as Pier Ferdinando Casini, described it as "useless".^[26] Others also argued that the career separation was bad because the prosecutors should be trained as judges as in the Italian system the goal of both prosecutors and judges is to reach the judicial truth, with the prosecutors free to request the acquittal of the defendant; data showed that around 50% of the time judges acquit the defendants from which the prosecutor had request a trial.^[23] Additionally, the magistrate would no longer be able to appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation against a decision by the High Disciplinary Court and would not be granted the three-degrees of judgement; instead the magistrate could only appeal the decision to the same High Disciplinary Court, albeit it would not be composed of the same judicial panel.^[27] Finally, critics cited the high cost of the reform when the same amount of spending could be used to hire more magistrates and digitalise the system,^[28] that no country use sortition and that it would be "a genuine humiliation of the democratic rules and constitutional principles on active and passive suffrage", citing the board of the Union of the Italian Criminal Chambers (UCPI) in 2019 but that was in favour of the 2025 reform,^[29] and also observed that there were unclear aspects due to the fact that part of the reform would require ordinary laws for its functioning, in particular the organisation of the new bodies.^[23]

Critics did not see the Nordio Reform as a justice reform but as a magistrature reform that the government was seeking to control politically,^[30] and it would lead towards illiberalism and authoritarianism, citing the abolition of the crime of abuse of office, the weakening of the Court of Audit and the crime of influence peddling, a de facto penal populism (giustizialismo) through various repressive decrees and laws establishing new crimes under the guise of "law and order" and security decrees, and the direct election of the prime minister (premierato).^[31] Critics also argued that the separation of career was part of a reform project that marked the history of the Italian Republic between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, having already been envisaged in the "Democratic Rebirth Plan" drawn up by Licio Gelli and Propaganda Due (P2), a criminal Masonic lodge with far-right and neo-fascist links involved through Gelli as the instigator of the Bologna station massacre, and that in turn was consubstantial with the various attempts at subversion, such as the Borghese coup, the Piano Solo, and the "strategy of tension".^[32] Gelli's son, Maurizio Gelli, said that Meloni's government was implementing many of his father's ideas, including the separation of careers, psycho-aptitude tests for magistrates, and presidentialism.^[33][34][35]

Supporters generally responded that the career separation is typical of liberal democracy, while the unitary system is typical of authoritarian regimes.^[36] They also argued that if de facto there already is a career separation with the Cartabia Reform, there should be no issue in making it de jure, and observed that the text of the reform would maintain the same wording about the autonomy and independence of the magistrature, that the public prosecutors would not be put under the executive and would still be bound by Article 358 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the prosecutor to also seek evidence in favour of the defendant.^[37] Another line of argument was that the reform would make the judiciary more efficient and just, by providing a truly impartial judge and that the prosecutor would also be more impartial, and that by reducing political factionalism within the CSM, the reform would make the magistrature more independent.^[38] The argument was that judges are not truly independent because they are judged by a CSM with a strong presence of investigating magistrates (prosecutors), also citing 5,933 wrongful detentions from 2017 to 2024 that costed the state €254 million in compensation.^[38]

Supporters observed that the reform was different by the ones proposed by Gelli, former Prime Minister and Italian Socialist Party (PSI) leader Bettino Craxi, and Silvio Berlusconi,^[37] and that the career separation was proposed by the centre-left coalition in the 1990s under Massimo D'Alema and in the late 2010s during the secretary of Maurizio Martina, and that it would be in line with the 1988 reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which moved the Italian system from a traditionally inquisitorial system to a more adversial or accusatorial system and bore the name of the PSI jurist Giuliano Vassalli.^[39] Supporters of the reform criticised their opponents for engaging in what they saw as fearmongering by postulating that the reform would lead towards illiberalism and authoritarianism.^[40] They cited as evidence left-wing individuals who came out in support of the reform and publicly expressed their favourable vote in the referendum.^[41] Supporters of the reforms lamented that "blacklists" circulated in WhatsApp chats among magistrates opposed to the reform, criticising constitutionalists who came in favour of the reform.^[42]

Supporters, particularly those of the centre-right coalition and within the Meloni government, often claim a political bias or argue that the magistrature is politicised,^[43] an allegation dating back to the Berlusconi era, where he often adopted red-baiting rhetoric by attacking magistrates as "communists" or with the epithet "red robes" (toghe rosse), the latter an expression still used by the Italian right.^[38] In an official statement on 21 December 2024, in response to the sentences handed down by judges against senators Matteo Renzi and Salvini, the UCPI stated that there had been a "political use of the judicial system by the judiciary", that such use had "subversive overtones", and therefore hoped to "put an end to this trend through a comprehensive constitutional reform of the judiciary".^[43] In January 2026, the "Pannella Sciascia Tortora Committee", promoted by the Transnational Radical Party (PRT) to support the referendum on the separation of judicial careers, was reported to have filed a complaint against the leaders of the "Right to Say No" committee, accusing them of the misdemeanor offense under Article 656 of the Criminal Code ("publication or dissemination of false, exaggerated, or biased news, capable of disturbing public order") for promoting the dissemination of a propaganda poster reading: "Would you like judges who depend on politicians? No. With the Nordio law, politicians want to control the decisions of magistrates. VOTE NO IN THE REFERENDUM."^[13]

The view that the government sought to politically control the magistrature was notably held by historian Alessandro Barbero, who was criticised by fact-checkers for a number of misleading claims; while they found that he presented a fairly accurate summary of the Italian justice system, they found that the text of the reform did not reflect the issues presented by Barbero.^[44] In particular, they found that Barbero's criticism was essentially valid for past proposed judicial reforms such as that of Berlusconi but did not fit the Nordio reform.^[45] In turn, there was a controversy about censorship as his video was removed by Facebook.^[46] Fact-checkers denied that it was a censorship, stated that they verify the facts, not the opinions, and clarified that while Barbero's criticism was not factual, his view that the reform risks leading towards illiberalism or authoritarianism (through the political control of the magistrature) represented a legitimate political opinion that cannot be presently verified as it was a prediction about the reform's effects, and that the video should not have been removed by Facebook.^[47]

Others rejected the textualist argument adopted by fact-checkers and argued that context was important, and the perceived fearmongering was in fact legitimate or even justified, citing the statements by the government ministers, who appeared to suggest that the reason of the reform was to better control the magistrature, which it accused of an alleged political bias and interference, after courts rejected several of the government's key proposals.^[13] On 30 October 2025, Meloni, after denouncing "yet another act of invasion of jurisdiction over the decisions of the government and Parliament", stated that "the constitutional reform of the justice system and the reform of the Court of Auditors, soon to be approved by the Senate, are the most appropriate response to this intrusiveness, which will not halt the government's action."^[13] In a speech to the National Council of Lawyers, Alfredo Mantovano denounced "the courts' tendency to deny regulatory space to the legislature", which he said eroded the scope for direct expression of popular sovereignty, adding: "Today, there is a block on expulsions thanks to judicial decisions, there is a block on security, on industrial policy that seeks to achieve certain objectives—think of the Ilva steelworks—thanks to judicial decisions. This is an invasion of the field that must be addressed."^[13] On 22 November 2025, Salvini described the decision by the Juvenile Court of L'Aquila to remove six- and eight-year-old children from their parents in the "family in the woods" case as a "kidnapping".^[13] Nordio himself stated that the phenomenon of the alleged invasion of judicial power was not unique to Italy but also concerned other countries.^[13] In January 2026, Meloni made a statement on the April 2026 Hungarian parliamentary election, calling on Hungarian voters to confirm the government of Viktor Orbán; according to a European Union report, Orbán's government severely reduced the independence of judges, so much so that the European Commission decided to suspend funds destined for Hungary due to violations of the rule of law, including those related to the independence of the judiciary.^[13]

In support of their arguments, critics of the reform cited statements by Nordio himself that they say are a "confession" of the real intention behind the reform and that justifies their concerns. Cited statements by Nordio included that the reform would be useful for the opposition if they were to return to government ("It amazes me that an intelligent person like Elly Schlein doesn't understand that this reform would also benefit them, if they were to take office") and that just because Gelli supported the career separation, this did not entail that the reform was automatically bad ("I don't know P2's plan. I can say that if Mr. Licio Gelli's interpretation, or rather his opinion, was correct, there's no reason why it shouldn't be followed because he said so. Truths don't depend on who proclaims them, but on the objectivity they represent ... If Gelli said that Jesus died on the cross, that doesn't mean we should say he died of pneumonia, or that a broken clock tells the right time twice a day. Even if Gelli stumbled over the truth, that doesn't mean the truth is no longer the truth"), which was described as a gaffe.^[48] In February 2026, Nordio stated that the reform "will not and must not have political effects" and that if those in favour of the reform were to win the referendum, there would be a dialogue with the magistrature.^[49]

On 9 March 2026, the Ministry of Justice chief of staff Giusi Bartolozzi controversially called on voters to vote in favour of the reform "so we can get rid of the judiciary, which is [like] firing squads", and added that "I'm running away... I have an ongoing investigation. I'm running away from this country", if the reform was rejected,^[50][51] receiving criticism from the opposition,^[52][53][54] as well as the government; however, unlike the opposition, it refused to call for her resignation.^[55][56] Nordio apologised and later stated that Bartolozzi had already clarified that she was referring to "a small portion of politicised judges" and that she would "certainly have no difficulty apologising for words that I am sure don't reflect her thoughts and the esteem she has for the judiciary, of which, among other things, she herself is a part."^[57] Bartolazzi also explained that the comparison with firing squads was because it "alluded to the state of absolute prostration one finds oneself in when involved in a trial, especially if innocent. Effects that no acquittal can erase."^[58]

Simonetta Matone, a former magistrate and member of the Chamber of Deputies, criticised Nordio for causing the reform to lose support with "crazy statements", and said that he confused "what can be said in a living room with what can be said publicly". She added: "We all think the things he said, but they're things we can't say publicly because we've given the green light to a resurgence of the No front."^[59][60][61] In particular, she criticised the comparison made by Nordio between the CSM and "a para-mafia system",^[62] a statement he made a few days earlier.^[63][64][65]

Both sides of the debate engaged in some form of sensationalism or made misleading claims. Notably, Naples public prosecutor Nicola Gratteri made misleading claims about anti-mafia magistrates Paolo Borsellino and Giovanni Falcone, citing quotes by Borsellino and Falcone in interviews that never took place and again citing a real quote by Falcone expressing opposition to the career separation but decontexualising it.^[66] Among the first to express doubts about the veridicity of the quotes was the journalist Damiano Aliprandi, who wrote for Il Dubbio an article about it, and in turn La Notizia, which had published an article in July 2025 reporting the quotes, issued a retraction.^[67] In response, Il Foglio journalist Luciano Capone said that Gratteri, whom he described as a "frontman of the 'No' vote in the referendum", had read "a fake interview with Giovanni Falcone against career separation: one of those memes circulating on Facebook and WhatsApp, sometimes on Il Fatto", and joked: "If he verifies the evidence like this as a prosecutor, we're screwed."^[67] As observed by Capone and as found by fact-checkers, the fake quotes dated back to the summer of 2025 and appeared in Facebook groups and were shared as meme.^[67]

On 13 November 2025, Il Fatto Quotidiano editor-in-chief Marco Travaglio issued a retraction, stating: "When we're wrong, unlike the hoaxers who deliberately tell twenty lies a day, we apologise to our readers. And we do so today for having accepted at face value two incorrect quotes from Falcone and Borsellino, taken from written and online publications."^[67] Former Turin prosecutor Armando Spataro shared Gratteri's views, stating that Falcone himself underwent a change of career by switching from judge to prosecutor.^[68] Fact-checkers observed that it was misleading to claim that Borsellino and Falcone were either for or against the career separation as the judicial system they worked in was significantly different, that Falcone did not discuss the career separation as a magistrate, and that he was a member of a political faction within the CSM, narrowly losing the presidency by 13 votes.^[69] Among the other misleading claims was that the reform would avert cases of miscarriage of justice or so that as stated by Meloni from the stage of Atreju, calling for voting in favour of the justice reform, "there never will be another shameful case" like the Garlasco case, described by fact-checkers as "one of the most controversial legal cases of the last twenty years".^[70]

Unlike other types that are abrogative, the justice reform referendum was confirmatory, meaning that the law would come into force only if the popular vote was in favour.^[71] The governing parties did not organise a unified effort in favour of the reform. Meloni's Brothers of Italy (FdI) notably avoided using its party symbol in its promotional materials, unlike the League (Lega) and Forza Italia (FI), which maintained their traditional branding.^[72] Lega launched the campaign with the slogan "I Vote Yes – The Reform that Brings Justice".^[73] Us Moderates (NM) and the Associative Movement of Italians Abroad (MAIE) established the Committee for the Yes.^[74] FI leaders, such as Joseph William Catalano in Forlì, campaigned in honour of Berlusconi, stating that justice reform "precisely because it affects the citizen's identity and freedom, was for Silvio Berlusconi, and it is for us today, the reform of reforms" and that it would "finally realise Silvio Berlusconi's great dream", and called for an open debate "without ideological barriers".^[75]

The Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) of Luigi Marattin, a former member of the PD and Italia Viva (IV), became the first political party to formally establish a pro-reform committee named "Justice Yes".^[76] Action party leader Carlo Calenda also came out in support of the reform, describing it as a good one.^[77] Other parties expressed their favourable vote in the referendum despite flaws in the reform,^[78] and criticism of Meloni's rhetoric,^[79] reflecting their liberal, libertarian, and garantist views,^[80] with some imagining what Craxi would think of it.^[81] Similarly, on the opposite side, there were those who expressed criticism of the magistrature and Italian justice but nonetheless expressed their vote against the reform in the referendum,^[82] and those who generally agreed with the reform but would vote against it in the referendum as a political act against the Meloni government, as was also argued by Nordio.^[83]

Several independent committees emerged in support of the constitutional changes. The "Yes to the Reform" committee was chaired by constitutional judge Nicolò Zanon, with journalist Alessandro Sallusti serving as spokesperson.^[84] The group included individuals affiliated with or formerly involved in FdI, Lega, and FI. The Luigi Einaudi Foundation launched the committee "Yes to Separation", presided over by lawyer Gian Domenico Caiazza and supported by various figures, such as Matteo Hallissey, former magistrate Antonio Di Pietro,^[85] former senator Andrea Cangini, and historian Ernesto Galli della Loggia. In July 2025, the UCPI had already established its own committee to back the reform. Notably, some figures traditionally associated with the centre-left coalition endorsed the "Yes" campaign, including former Italian Communist Party deputy and Constitutional Court of Italy former president Augusto Barbera,^[75] as did Francesca Scopelliti, the partner of Enzo Tortora, who was a well-known victim of a miscarriage of justice, and other prominent constitutionalists, such as Giulio Prosperetti and Nicolò Zanon.^[86] The association Libertà Eguale formed the committee "The Left That Votes Yes" led by Barbera, the former PD deputy Stefano Ceccanti, and the former minister Cesare Salvi, who opposed the broader left-wing decision to campaign against the reform. Additionally, Fabrizio Cicchitto, together with former ministers Claudio Signorile and Salvo Andò, launched the "Giuliano Vassalli Committee for Yes". On 21 January 2026, the "Populars for Yes" committee was established, chaired by constitutional scholar Giulio Prosperetti, further expanding the network of organisations advocating in favour of the constitutional reform.^[87][88]

The Democratic Party (PD) officially launched its campaign in favour of a "No" vote in the constitutional referendum on 24 January 2026, adopting the slogan "Vote No to defend the Constitution".^[89] The Five Star Movement (M5S) similarly structured its opposition campaign around the slogan "Vote No to the Save-the-Political-Elite Referendum", portraying the reform as a measure designed to protect the Meloni government's powers.^[20] The Green and Left Alliance (AVS) also criticised the constitutional reform, accusing it of aiming to concentrate excessive powers in the hands of the government.^[90] Extra-parliamentary parties soon started collecting signatures to reach the goal of 500,000 in order to have a longer electoral campaign.^[91] Alongside political parties, several civil society groups and professional organisations formed committees to oppose the reform. On 18 November 2025, the "Right to Say No" committee began its campaign under the leadership of the National Association of Magistrates [it] (ANM), with constitutional law professor Enrico Grosso as its head. This was followed on 10 December 2025 by the creation of "Lawyers for No", a committee launched by a group of attorneys and chaired by Franco Moretti.^[92]

On 10 January 2026, a broader coalition of organisations inaugurated the committee "Civil Society for No in the Constitutional Referendum" (bringing together "associations, jurists, and citizens to defend the Constitution, the autonomy of the judiciary, and oppose the Nordio Law, differentiated autonomy, and the premierate"), and Scientific Council of the "Civil Society Committee for the No" was established. In addition to joining the anti-reform committee, around 117 constitutional scholars joined its Scientific Committee, including three presidents emeritus of the Constitutional Court of Italy (Ugo De Siervo, Gaetano Silvestri, and Zagrebelsky) and a former vice president (Enzo Cheli).^[93] This group included among others the trade union CGIL, the anti-mafia association Libera, the National Association of Italian Partisans (ANPI), and the environmental organisation Legambiente. The committee was presided over by former deputy Giovanni Bachelet and supported by physicist and Nobel laureate Giorgio Parisi. In parallel with its campaigning activities, the committee also promoted a signature collection in support of the referendum process.^[94]

Several public intellectuals took positions in the debate. On 18 January 2026, Barbero publicly announced his opposition to the reform in a video message explaining his reasons.^[95] On 23 January, the video was removed by Meta Platforms, prompting the PD to submit a parliamentary inquiry addressed to Prime Minister Meloni regarding the episode.^[96] Opposition to the reform was further expressed by local government representatives. More than 150 mayors signed an appeal promoted by Italian Local Autonomies and the Civil Society for No committee. Among the signatories were prominent city leaders such as Roberto Gualtieri of Rome, Gaetano Manfredi of Naples, Stefano Lo Russo of Turin, Matteo Lepore of Bologna, Sara Funaro of Florence, Silvia Salis of Genoa, Massimo Zedda of Cagliari, and Vittoria Ferdinandi of Perugia.^[97] In February 2026, after the neo-fascist CasaPound came out in support of the reform, the PD took advantage of this to further their defence of the anti-fascist Constitution, sparking criticism among its own ranks from those who supported the reform and are anti-fascists.^[98]

Choice	Political party		Political orientation	Leader	Ref.
Y Yes		Brothers of Italy (FdI)	National conservatism	Giorgia Meloni	[99]
		League (Lega)	Right-wing populism	Matteo Salvini	[99]
		Forza Italia (FI)	Liberal conservatism	Antonio Tajani	[99]
		Action (Az)	Liberalism	Carlo Calenda	[99]
		Us Moderates (NM)	Liberal conservatism	Maurizio Lupi	[99]
		National Future (FN)	Nationalism	Roberto Vannacci	[100]
		More Europe (+E)	Liberalism	Riccardo Magi	[99]
		Coraggio Italia (CI)	Liberal conservatism	Luigi Brugnaro	[101]
		Associative Movement Italians Abroad (MAIE)	Italians abroad interests	Ricardo Antonio Merlo	[101]
		Union of the Centre (UdC)	Christian democracy	Antonio De Poli	[101]
		Fassa Association (AF)	Christian democracy	Luca Guglielmi	[102]
		Christian Democracy (DC)	Christian democracy	Raffaele De Rosa	[101]
		Christian Democracy with Rotondi (DCR)	Christian democracy	Gianfranco Rotondi	[101]
		New Italian Socialist Party (NPSI)	Social democracy	Stefano Caldoro	[81]
		Liberal Democratic Party (PLD)	Liberalism	Luigi Marattin	[101]
		Italian Radicals (RI)	Liberalism	Filippo Blengino	[103]
		South calls North (ScN)	Regionalism	Cateno De Luca	[101]
		Valdostan Union (UV)	Regionalism	Joël Farcoz	[101][nb 1]
		Christian Democracy (DC)	Christian democracy	Gianpiero Samorì	[105]
		Movement for Autonomy (MpA)	Regionalism	Raffaele Lombardo	[106]
		Italian Socialist Party (PSI)	Social democracy	Enzo Maraio	[80]
		Die Freiheitlichen (dF)	Separatism	Roland Stauder	[107]
		JWA List	Separatism	Jürgen Wirth Anderlan	[108]
		Liga Veneta Repubblica (LVR)	Regionalism	Fabrizio Comencini	[109]
		Moderates	Liberalism	Giacomo Portas	[110]
		Popular Alternative (AP)	Conservatism	Stefano Bandecchi	[111]
		Sovereign Popular Democracy (DSP)	Populism	Marco Rizzo	[112]
		The People of the Family (PdF)	Social conservatism	Mario Adinolfi	[113]
		Independence	Ultraconservatism	Gianni Alemanno	[114]
		Now! (ORA!)	Radical centrism	Michele Boldrin	[115]
		Italian Liberal Party (PLI)	Liberalism	Stefano De Luca	[116]
		Italian Republican Party (PRI)	Liberalism	Corrado De Rinaldis Saponaro	[116]
No official position		Italia Viva (IV)	Liberalism	Matteo Renzi	[117]
		South Tyrolean People's Party (SVP)	Regionalism	Dieter Steger	[118]
		South Tyrolean Freedom (STF)	Separatism	Sven Knoll	[119]
		Edelweiss (SA)	Regionalism	Ronny Bobey	[120]
N No		Democratic Party (PD)	Social democracy	Elly Schlein	[99]
		Five Star Movement (M5S)	Populism	Giuseppe Conte	[99]
		Green Europe (EV)	Green politics	Angelo Bonelli	[99]
		Italian Left (SI)	Democratic socialism	Nicola Fratoianni	[99]
		Campobase	Regionalism	Chiara Maule	[121]
		Centrists for Europe (CpE)	Christian democracy	Pier Ferdinando Casini	[26]
		Democratic Centre (CD)	Christian left	Bruno Tabacci	[122]
		Solidary Democracy (DemoS)	Christian left	Paolo Ciani	[122]
		Progressive Party (PP)	Progressivism	Massimo Zedda	[123]
		Greens of South Tyrol (Grüne)	Green politics	Luca Bertolini, Elide Mussner	[122]
		Team K (TK)	Liberalism	Paul Köllensperger	[124]
		Future Left (SF)	Democratic socialism	Luca Pizzuto	[125]
		Us of the Centre (NDC)	Christian democracy	Clemente Mastella	[126]
		Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)	Communism	Maurizio Acerbo	[127]
		Power to the People (PaP)	Left-wing populism	Marta Collot, Giuliano Granato	[17]
		Possible (Pos)	Social democracy	Francesca Druetti	[128]
		Volt Italy (Volt)	Eurofederalism	Daniela Patti	[129]
		Democracy and Autonomy (DemA)	Left-wing populism	Luigi de Magistris	[82]
		Communist Party (PC)	Communism	Alberto Lombardo	[130]
		Workers' Communist Party (PCL)	Communism	Marco Ferrando	[131]
		Italian Communist Party (PCI)	Communism	Mauro Alboresi	[132]
		Party of the South (PdS)	Meridionalism	Natale Cuccurese	[133]

Choice	Trade union	Leader	Ref.
No official position	Italian Confederation of Trades Unions (CISL)	Daniela Fumarola	[101][nb 2]
N No	Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL)	Maurizio Landini	[101]
	Italian Labour Union (UIL)	Pierpaolo Bombardieri	[101]

Choice	Organisation	Type	Leader	Ref.
Y Yes	Unitary Body of the Italian Bar Association (OUA)	Bar association	Mirella Casiello	[101]
	Transnational Radical Party (PRT)	Political association	Maurizio Turco	[13]
	Hands Off Cain (NTC)	Anti-death penalty non-governmental organisation	Rita Bernardini	[101]
	Union of the Italian Criminal Chambers (UCPI)	Lawyers' union	Francesco Petrelli	[101]
	National Council of Lawyers (CNF)	Bar association	Francesco Greco	[101]
	Luigi Einaudi Foundation (FLE)	Research institute	Giuseppe Benedetto	[101]
	Enzo Tortora Foundation (FET)	Pro-civil rights and pro-judicial reform organisation	Francesca Scopelliti	[101]
N No	National Association of Magistrates (ANM)	Associative body of magistrates	Cesare Parodi	[101]
	Libera	Anti-mafia association	Luigi Ciotti, Francesca Rispoli	[101]
	National Association of Italian Partisans (ANPI)	Partisan veterans' association	Gianfranco Pagliarulo	[101]
	Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI)	Non-profit association	Walter Massa	[101]
	Christian Associations of Italian Workers (ACLI)	Lay Catholic association	Emiliano Manfredonia	[101]
	Pax Christi (PC)	Catholic peace movement	Giovanni Ricchiuti	[101]
	Legambiente	Pro-environmentalist association	Stefano Ciafani	[101]
	Articolo 21 (A21)	Pro-free speech advocacy group	Paolo Borrometi	[101]
	National Association of Democratic Jurists (GD)	Law collective	Aurora d'Agostino, Cesare Antetomaso, Roberto Lamacchia, Fabio Marcelli	[101]
	Freedom and Justice (LG)	Cultural political association	Daniela Padoan	[101]
	Federconsumatori	Pro-consumer rights association	Michele Carrus	[101]
	Auser	Voluntary association	Domenico Pantaleo	[101]
	Democratic Medicine (MD)	Pro-health rights political movement	Marco Caldiroli	[101]
	High School Students Network (RSM)	Students' union	Angela Verdecchia	[101]
	Students' Union (UDS)	Students' union	Alice Beccari, Tommaso Martelli	[101]
	Union of University Students (UDU)	Students' union	Alessandro Bruscella	[101]

Date	Polling firm	YYes	NNo	Lead
7 Mar 2026	Cassandra	49.7	50.3	0.6
6 Mar 2026	YouTrend	50.1	49.9	0.2
6 Mar 2026	BiDiMedia	50.5	49.5	1.0
26 Feb 2026	BiDiMedia	52.3	47.7	4.6
26 Feb 2026	YouTrend	51.2	48.8	2.4
12 Feb 2026	YouTrend	53.0	47.0	6.0

Date	Polling firm	YYes	NNo	Lead
6 Mar 2026	BiDiMedia[nb 3]	49.0	51.0	2.0
	BiDiMedia[nb 4]	49.8	50.2	0.4
	BiDiMedia[nb 5]	50.7	49.3	1.4
6 Mar 2026	EMG Different	42.4	42.6	0.2
6 Mar 2026	SWG	48.0	52.0	4.0
5 Mar 2026	Tecnè	51.5	48.5	3.0
23 Feb 2026	Ixè	47.2	52.8	5.6
23 Feb 2026	Tecnè	55.0	45,0	10.0
20 Feb 2026	Demopolis	49.0	51.0	2.0
17 Feb 2026	Only Numbers	52.3	47.7	4.6
11 Feb 2026	YouTrend	48.9	51.1	2.2
5 Feb 2026	Only Numbers	52.5	47.5	5.0
2 Feb 2026	Demopolis	39.0	35.0	4.0
29 Jan 2026	Eumetra	51.5	48.5	3.0
27 Jan 2026	Ixè	50.1	49.9	0.2
24 Jan 2026	Eumetra	52.2	47.8	4.4
22 Jan 2026	YouTrend	55.0	45.0	10.0
17 Jan 2026	Lab21	62.8	37.2	25.6
16 Jan 2026	Piepoli	59.0	41.0	18.0
15 Jan 2026	Eumetra	52.7	47.3	5.4
16 Dec 2025	Ipsos	50.3	49.7	0.6
11 Dec 2025	YouTrend	56.7	43.3	13.4
27 Nov 2025	Ixè	53.2	46.8	6.4
11 Nov 2025	YouTrend	56.1	43.9	12.2
31 Oct 2025	IZI	70.9	29.1	41.8
6 Oct 2025	BiDiMedia	33.0	30.0	3.0

Choice	Votes	%
No	15,085,410	53.24
Yes	13,250,709	46.76
Valid votes	28,336,119	98.94
Invalid or blank votes	304,104	1.06
Total votes	28,640,223	100.00
Registered voters/turnout	51,425,745	55.69
Source: Ministry of the Interior[134]

Region	YYes	NNo	Turnout
Abruzzo	48.23%	51.77%	60.50%
Basilicata	39.97%	60.03%	53.26%
Calabria	42.74%	57.26%	48.39%
Campania	34.78%	65.22%	50.38%
Emilia-Romagna	42.75%	57.25%	66.67%
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	54.47%	45.53%	61.62%
Lazio	45.40%	54.60%	61.70%
Liguria	42.97%	57.03%	62.24%
Lombardy	53.56%	46.44%	63.76%
Marche	46.26%	53.74%	63.77%
Molise	45.30%	54.70%	54.01%
Piedmont	46.50%	53.50%	62.61%
Apulia	42.86%	57.14%	52.03%
Sardinia	40.56%	59.44%	52.85%
Sicily	39.02%	60.98%	46.13%
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol	49.41%	50.59%	52.45%
Tuscany	41.84%	58.16%	66.27%
Umbria	48.32%	51.68%	65.05%
Aosta Valley	48.19%	51.81%	58.59%
Veneto	58.41%	41.59%	63.48%
Italy	46.26%	53.74%	58.93%
Europe	43.76%	56.24%	26.91%
South America	72.86%	27.14%	33.74%
North and Central America	57.64%	42.36%	22.45%
Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Antartica	53.02%	46.98%	22.18%
Abroad	56.34%	43.66%	28.53%
Total (Italy+Abroad)	46.77%	53.23%	55.69%
Source: Ministry of Interior[135]

The electorate for the referendum consisted of 51,425,112 voters, from which 45,946,273 in Italy (registered in 61,533 sections) and 5,478,839 residing abroad (registered in 2,207 consular districts). By the end of the first day of voting, the turnout was reported at 46%, which was significantly higher than expected.^[136]

Sociology of the electorate
Demographic	YYes	NNo	Percentage
Total vote	46.2%	53.7%	55.7%
Sex
Men	48.5%	51.5%	48.5%
Women	44.1%	55.9%	51.5%
Age
18–34 years old	44.7%	55.3%	20.8%
35–49 years old	42.4%	57.6%	22.3%
50–64 years old	53.3%	46.7%	27.9%
65 or older	43.4%	56.6%	29.0%
Generation
Generation Z	41.5%	58.5%	13.1%
Millennials	45.2%	54.8%	21.5%
Generation X	48.3%	51.7%	29.4%
Baby Boomers & Silent	47.2%	52.8%	36.0%
Education
University	32.1%	67.9%	16.2%
High school	47.4%	52.6%	35.6%
Elementary/Middle school	51.4%	48.6%	48.2%
Economic condition
Upper	40.1%	59.9%	7.6%
Middle-upper	46.2%	53.8%	17.4%
Middle	48.6%	51.4%	32.2%
Middle-lower	46.8%	53.2%	30.4%
Lower	42.9%	57.1%	12.4%
Occupation
Manager/Entrepreneur	42.8%	57.2%	5.5%
Self-employed	46.1%	53.9%	6.7%
White-collar	46.5%	53.5%	18.3%
Blue-collar	50.4%	49.6%	17.8%
Unemployed	46.0%	54.0%	7.4%
Student	36.4%	63.6%	5.3%
Housewife	57.4%	42.6%	12.3%
Retired	43.0%	57.0%	26.7%
Religion
Regular practitioner	52.8%	47.2%	15.8%
Occasional practitioner	54.6%	45.4%	28.3%
Non-practitioner	50.9%	49.1%	17.1%
Others	47.9%	52.1%	5.4%
None	31.6%	68.4%	33.4%
Political position
Left-wing	5.8%	94.2%	11.7%
Centre-left	15.4%	84.6%	16.1%
Centre	50.9%	49.1%	8.4%
Centre-right	89.0%	11.0%	17.5%
Right-wing	93.3%	6.7%	10.7%
Independent	36.8%	63.2%	35.7%
Source: Ipsos Italia[137]

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding missing information. (March 2026)

The victory of the "No" side was seen as a blow to the Meloni government and a boost to opposition parties ahead of the 2027 Italian general election.^[138]

The day before the referendum, Salvini (Deputy Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of Infrastructure and Transport) broke election silence by posting an image on X (formerly Twitter) with the word "SÌ" ("YES").^{[139][140][141][142]}

During the first day of the referendum, many parties, in particular the M5S and AVS, reported irregularities during the voting, such as a billboard with the word "YES!" in Genoa,^[143] police officers contesting the list representatives at the seats of the "No" committee for the legitimate use of the sign with the committee's logo and also preventing them from being admitted and therefore voting,^[144] and the presence of representatives of the FdI and Lega lists who gave voting instructions (for "Yes") at the polling stations (even with pins).^[145][146]

FI members, such as Fulvio Martusciello, also reported the use of public transport in Naples to indicate to vote "No".^[147]

A polling station in Sassari did not conclude the count of votes after the polls closed because there was a discrepancy between the number of ballots and votes. Ballots were sent to be counted by the Provincial Office for the Referendum at the Court of Sassari.^[148]

• Constitutional laws of Italy
• Judiciary of Italy

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